Patterns and Pattern Diagrams for Access Control by Fernandez, Eduardo B. et al.
Patterns and Pattern Diagrams for Access Control 
Eduardo B. Fernandez1 , Günther Pernul2 and Maria M. Larrondo-Petrie1 
1 Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA 
 ed@cse.fau.edu | petrie@fau.edu 
2 University of Regensburg, Universitätsstraße 31, Regensburg, Germany 
guenther.pernul@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de 
Abstract: Access control is a fundamental aspect of security. There are many 
variations of the basic access control models and it is confusing for a software 
developer to select an appropriate model for her application. The result in 
practice is that only basic models are used and the power of more advanced 
models is thus lost. We try to clarify this panorama here through the use of 
patterns. In particular, we use pattern diagrams to navigate the pattern space. A 
pattern diagram shows relationships between patterns and we can see how 
different models relate to each other. A subproduct of our work is the analysis 
of which patterns are available for use and which need to be written. Pattern 
maps are also useful to perform semi-automatic model transformations as 
required for Model-Driven Development (MDD). The idea is to provide the 
designer of a secure system with a navigation tool that she can use to select an 
appropriate pattern from a catalog of security patterns. We also indicate how to 
compose new access control models by adding features to an existing pattern 
and how to define patterns by analogy. 
1  Introduction 
The development of secure systems requires that security be considered at all stages 
of design, so as to not only satisfy their functional specifications but also satisfy 
security requirements. Several methodologies that apply security at all stages have 
been proposed [1], [2], [3].  Some of these methodologies start from use cases and 
from them a conceptual model is developed. Security constraints are then defined in 
the conceptual model. To do this we need high-level models that represent the 
security policies that constrain applications. One of the most fundamental aspects of 
security is access control. 
Although there are only a few basic access control models, many varieties of them 
have been proposed. It is confusing for a software developer to select an appropriate 
model for her application. Access control models generally represent a few types of 
security policies, e.g. “rights are assigned to roles”, and provide a formalization of 
these policies using some ad hoc notation. Four basic access control models are 
commonly used and they may be extended to include content and context-based 
access control, delegation of rights, hierarchical structuring of subjects (including 
roles), objects, or access types [4], temporal constraints, etc. Access control models 
can be defined for different architectural levels, including application, database 
systems, operating systems, and firewalls [5]. Some of them apply to any type of 
systems while some are specialized, e.g. for distributed systems. 
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Access control models fall into two basic categories: Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC), where users’ rights are defined by administrators and data may be labeled to 
indicate its sensitivity, and Discretionary Access Control (DAC), where users may 
administer the data items they create and own. In a MAC model, users and data are 
classified by administrators and the system applies a set of built-in rules that users 
cannot circumvent. In a DAC model, there is no clear separation of use and 
administration; users can be owners of the data they create and act as their 
administrators. Orthogonal to this classification, there are several models for access 
control to information that differ on how they define and enforce their policies [6], 
[7]. The most common are:   
• The Multilevel model organizes the data using security levels. This model is 
usually implemented as a mandatory model where its entities are labeled 
indicating their levels. This model is able to reach a high degree of security, 
although it can be too rigid for some applications. Usually, it is not possible to 
structure the variety of entities involved in complex applications into strictly 
hierarchical structures. 
• The Access Matrix describes access by subjects (actors, entities) to protected 
objects (data/resources) in specific ways (access types) [8], [6], [7]. It is more 
flexible than the multilevel model and it can be made even more flexible and 
precise using predicates and other extensions. However, it is intrinsically a 
discretionary model in which users own the data objects and may grant access to 
other subjects. It is not clear who owns the medical or financial information and 
the discretionary property reduces security. This model is usually implemented 
using Access Control Lists (lists of the subjects that can access a given object) or 
Capabilities (tickets that allow a process to access some objects).  
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), collects users into roles based on their tasks 
or functions and assigns rights to each role [9]. Some of these models, e.g. [10], 
[11], have their roles structured as hierarchies, which may simplify administration. 
RBAC has been extended and combined in many ways. 
• Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). This model controls access based on 
properties (attributes) of subjects or objects. It is used in environments where 
subjects may not be pre-registered [12].  
While these basic models may be useful for specific domains or applications, they 
are not flexible enough for the full range of policies present in some of these 
applications [5], [4]. This is manifested in the large variety of ad hoc RBAC 
variations that have been proposed; most of which add specialized policies to a basic 
RBAC model. For example, some models have added content or context-dependent 
access [13], delegation [14], task-based access [15], and relationships between role 
entities [16]. All these models effectively incorporate a set of built-in access control 
policies and cannot handle situations not considered by these policies, which means 
that a complex system may need several of these models for specific users or 
divisions. 
All these models present a bewildering set of options to the designer, who has 
problems deciding which model to use. The result in practice is that only basic models 
are used and the power of more advanced models is thus lost. We try to clarify this 
panorama here through the use of patterns. In particular, we use pattern diagrams to 
navigate the pattern space. A pattern diagram shows relationships between patterns 
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(represented by rectangles with rounded corners). A subproduct of our work is the 
analysis of which patterns are available for use and which need to be written. Pattern 
maps are also useful to perform semi-automatic model transformations as required for 
Model-Driven Development (MDD). They can serve as metamodels of possible 
solutions being added at each transformation. 
A pattern is an encapsulated solution to a recurrent problem in a given context. In 
particular, a security pattern describes a mechanism that is a solution to the problem 
of controlling a set of specific threats [17]. This solution is affected by some forces 
and can be expressed using UML class, sequence, state, and activity diagrams. A set 
of consequences indicate how well the forces were satisfied; in particular, how well 
the attacks can be handled by the pattern.  A study of the forces and consequences of 
a pattern is important before their final adoption; however, a good initial pattern 
selection is fundamental to avoid a lengthy search through textual pattern 
descriptions. A requirement for a pattern is that the solution it describes has been used 
in at least three real systems [18], [19]. This is consistent with the idea of patterns as 
best practices. However, a pattern can also describe solutions that have not been used 
(or have been used only once) but appear general and useful for several situations. 
Because of this, we include here both types: good practices patterns and useful 
solutions patterns. In fact, as mentioned above, many models have never been used in 
practice.  
We do not attempt to be exhaustive because the quantity of models is too large, 
some are just simple variations of others, and some appear to have scarce practical 
value. How exhaustive the catalog needs to be depends on the variety of applications 
to be handled. The idea is to provide the designer of a secure system with a way to 
organize a navigation tool that she can use to select an appropriate pattern from a 
catalog of security patterns. We also indicate how to compose new access control 
models by adding features to an existing pattern and how to define patterns by 
analogy. 
Section 2 presents the use of pattern diagrams to relate access control models. 
Section 3 discusses how patterns can be defined at different levels of abstraction. 
Section 4 considers how to grow new models from existing ones, while Section 5 
shows how to obtain models by analogy. We end with some conclusions. 
2  Pattern diagrams for access control patterns 
Access control models have two aspects: a definition of a set of rules specifying the 
valid accesses (some of them may be implied by other rules), and an enforcement 
mechanism that intercepts access requests from users or processes and determines if 
the request is valid. The main difference between models is on the way they define 
their rules, so it makes sense to separate the patterns for enforcement mechanisms; 
that is, we should provide separate patterns for rules and for enforcement 
mechanisms. Typically, there is much less variety in the enforcement mechanism: it 
intercepts requests and makes a decision based on the rules. As an illustration of how 
pattern diagrams can put models in perspective, Figure 1 shows some variations of 
access control models. One of the first access control models was the access matrix. 
The basic access matrix [7] included the tuple {s,o,t}, where s indicates a subject or 
active entity, o is the protected object or resource, and t indicates the type of access 
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permitted. [8] proved security properties of this model using the so-called HRU 
(Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman) model. In that model users are allowed to delegate their 
rights (discretionary property, delegatable authorization), implying a tuple {s,o,t,f}, 
where f is a Boolean copy flag indicating if the right is allowed to be delegated or not. 
A predicate was added later to the basic rule to allow content-based authorization 
[20], becoming {s,o,t,p,f}, where p is the predicate (the predicate could also include 
environment variables). Patterns for the basic rule and for the one with tuple 
{s,o,t,p,f} were given in [21], [17]. The rule could also include the concept of 
Authorizer (a), becoming {a,s,o,t,p,f} [22] (Explicitly Granted Authorization). RBAC 
[9] can be considered a special interpretation of the basic authorization model, where 
subjects are roles instead of individual users. We presented two varieties of RBAC 
patterns in [21] and [17].  We combined it with sessions in [23] (The double-lined 
patterns of Figure 1). Several variations and extensions of these models have 
appeared. We presented a variation called Metadata-Based Access Control, which 
later we renamed Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [12].  
Figure 1 assumed that we started from some known models. Figure 2 starts from 
the basic components of access control to provide a more general approach to 
developing access control models (we did not show the labels of the links for 
simplicity). This diagram can be the starting point that allows a designer to select the 
type of access control he needs in his application. Once this abstract level is clear, we 
need to go to a software-oriented level where we can choose more specific 
approaches. The center of this diagram is Policy-Based Access Control (PABC) 
which indicates that the rules represent access policies, which are in turn defined by a 
Policy pattern. The Policy-Based Access Control pattern decides if a subject is 
authorized to access an object according to policies defined in a central policy 
repository. The enforcement of these policies is defined by a Reference Monitor 
pattern. Depending on its administration, PABC can be MAC or DAC. XACML is a 
type of PBAC oriented SOA [24], shown here as two patterns for its aspects of rule 
definition and evaluation. Policies can be implemented as Access Control Lists 
(ACLs) or Capabilities. The NIST pattern is a variety of RBAC discussed in Section 
4. The reference Monitor may use a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a Policy 
Definition Point (PDP), and other patterns to describe the administrative structure of 
enforcement [24]. The Access Matrix can be extended with predicates or a copy flag 
and both can be used in another variation of this model. 
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3  Levels of abstraction 
Models and their patterns may correspond to different abstraction levels; for example, 
the concept of session is a concept at a lower level than RBAC because it indicates an 
abstract mechanism to restrict the concurrent use of some rights (which may produce 
conflicts of interest). It is possible to make explicit in the pattern diagram the 
abstraction level of the patterns Figure 3 shows these levels explicitly, showing the 
Policy Model, Policy Rule,and reference Monitor at the highest level, while PBAC 
and the Session-Based Reference Monitor are more implementation-oriented. Many 
times we do not emphasize this separation; however, when we deal with different 
architectural levels this separation is important; for example, the implementation of 
access control at the file system level is quite different from authorization rules at the 
application level. Figure 3 also shows how some of the patterns of Figure 1 could 
have been found starting from the components of Figure 2:  We can define a Session-
Based Reference Monitor that requires the concept of Access Session to delimit the 
rights of the user. This figure also emphasizes the separation of Policy Model and 
Policy Rules, not shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. A classification of access control patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Deriving specialized patterns from abstract models 
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4  Using the diagrams 
Let’s consider a financial application. The threats to this system have been identified 
and indicate that we need access control for classes Account, Transaction, and 
Customer. The designer refers to a diagram such as Figure 2 and starts by choosing 
PBAC because we need to apply banking policies to control access; for example, the 
owner of the account has the right to deposit and withdraw money from the account. 
The designer then chooses the Access Matrix model because access to accounts is 
given to individuals, not roles. As owners should only access their own accounts, we 
need predicates in the Access Matrix.  Later, when the software architecture is 
defined, the designer decides to use web services, because ATMs and branch offices 
make this application highly distributed. Since any PBAC can be implemented using  
XACML, the designer implements a Predicate Access Matrix using XACML.  
5  Growing new models 
To apply this design approach we need good pattern catalogs. In this and the next 
section we see two approaches to develop catalogs. Each pattern can be augmented 
with new features to produce a new model with larger functionality. Figure 4 shows 
the basic RBAC pattern, where users are assigned to roles and roles are given rights. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) RBAC pattern follows 
the NIST standard [21] and allows access to resources based on the role of the subject 
and adds several functions to the basic model. The NIST standard also adds a linear 
role hierarchy. A subject may have several roles. Each role collects the rights that a 
user can activate at a given moment (execution context), while a session controls the 
way of using roles and can enforce role exclusion at execution time. Strictly, the 
NIST standard allows only linear role hierarchies, while Figure 5 shows recursive 
hierarchies (described by the Composite pattern [19]). Figure 5 shows also 
object/resource recursive hierarchies. Similarly, we can separate administrative roles 
and rights and give roles to groups of users for example. The idea is that new 
functions require only adding more classes and their corresponding associations. In 
fact, the pattern chains in the models of Figures 1 and 2 can be obtained in this way; 
for example, in Figure 2 we added a session to RBAC to obtain an NIST RBAC 
pattern. 
Combining this idea with architectural levels we can define different variations of 
these patterns intended for more specialized uses. For example, [25] shows an RBAC 
model where access to objects is performed through views. Specific views carry sets 
of rights as in the case of database systems. We can also formalize these models by 
adding OCL constraints in each pattern. The constraints may make functionality more 
specific, for example, by defining constraints among variables, or may define pre- or 
post-conditions for the pattern. As each model is derived from a simpler model, it is 
easy for the designer to see the differences and possibilities of each model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Patterns and Pattern Diagrams for Access Control      7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic RBAC pattern 
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Fig. 5.  Class model for RBAC with sessions and role/resource hierarchies 
6  Finding access control models by analogy 
Analogy is another way to derive models from existing models [26].A model for 
medical records such as the one in Figure 6 represents typical policies used in HIPAA 
and other regulations. In particular, this model represents the policies: 
• A Patient role that has the rights to read his own record and authorize the use of 
this record.  
• A Doctor role showing that a given doctor may act as custodian for a patient 
record. 
• The Medical Record, that includes the constraint that any reading of a record by 
persons other than health providers, must be notified to the corresponding patient. 
• Specific medical records may be associated (linked) with other records to 
describe, for example, family relationships and physical contact, needed to trace 
genetic or infectious diseases. 
If we need a model for the Sarbanes/Oxley regulations, we can make the following 
analogies: Patient—Investor; Doctor—Broker; Hospital—Financial Institution; 
Medical Record—Financial Record. This leads to Figure 7, which is basically the 
same structure although the behavior semantics of some classes may be different.  
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Fig. 6.  A model for medical policies 
6  Conclusions 
We have tried to unify the many access control model varieties by using patterns. We 
believe that this perspective can help developers to align their needs with the selection 
of appropriate access control models. The selected access control pattern not only 
guides the conceptual security of the application but later it also guides the actual 
implementation of the model.  
We can navigate the pattern diagram because (as shown in Section 4) patterns are 
composable with features, i.e. adding a feature (perhaps embodied by another pattern) 
produces a new pattern with extra features. If we have a pattern diagram we can 
navigate in it to find an appropriate pattern 
Using this approach we can not only clarify the relationships of access control 
models but it has led us also to discover the need for new security patterns: Subject, 
Object, Labeled Security, DAC, MAC. Access control patterns give us also the 
possibility of evaluating commercial products: we can see if the product contains the 
corresponding pattern in its design. 
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Fig. 7.  A pattern that includes some of the Sarbanes Oxley policies 
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We are working on the necessary environment to use this approach, including: 
• A complete catalog of security patterns including many varieties of access 
control models to let designers find the required solution to each security 
situation 
• A classification of patterns according to their security concerns and 
architectural level. We proposed such a classification in [27].  
• A tool incorporating pattern classifications and a catalog. Pattern maps 
would make use of pattern classifications to select which patterns to present 
to a designer; for example, operating system-level patterns to a system 
designer.  
• A standard representation of security patterns. This is important for 
implementing tools and for a more widespread use of security patterns. 
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